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UPDATES FROM THE REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMS
euRoPeaN couRT of  
humaN RighTs
In 1959, the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (Convention) 
established the European Court of Human 
Rights (Court). The Court enforces the 
obligations entered into by the Council 
of Europe’s Contracting States. Any 
Contracting State or individual may allege 
violations of the Convention by filing a 
complaint with the Court.
laNdmaRk RuliNg sTRikes  
doWN comPulsoRy Religious 
classes iN TuRkey
The tension between Turkey’s secular-
ism and hopes of joining the European 
Union came to a head in the Court in early 
October 2007. In a case involving compul-
sory religious lessons at school, a Turkish 
parent argued that his right to freedom of 
religion allowed him to prevent his daugh-
ter from attending those lessons.
Eylem Zengin, the student in the case, 
and her father are Alevi, an Islamic sect 
related to the Shi’ia branch of Islam. At 
least ten percent of Turks are Alevi, but 
Turks in general are predominantly Sunni. 
The Zengins, along with other Alevis, 
protest against the compulsory religious 
classes because the classes focus on Sunni 
beliefs and fail to recognize Alevism. The 
Turkish Ministry of Education, on the 
other hand, states that “the mentality of the 
new school books is quite different,” and 
that the religious education syllabus men-
tions Alevism. A teacher familiar with the 
new syllabus says that changes in the syl-
labus do not have a significant effect on the 
content of the religious lessons, however, 
because “most of the teachers are con-
servative Sunni Muslims who see them-
selves more as missionaries than teachers.” 
The Ministry of Education could monitor 
teachers, but the Ministry members are 
also Sunni and, thus, may be unlikely to 
prevent teachers from focusing solely on 
Sunni teachings.
The Court ruled on October 9, 2007 that 
Turkey’s insistence that Ms. Zengin attend 
compulsory religious classes violated 
Article 2 of Protocol 1 to the Convention, 
which requires the government to “respect 
the right of parents to ensure… education 
in conformity with their own religious … 
convictions.” Parents, therefore, have the 
right to religious freedom, and the Turkish 
government must respect that right by not 
forcing students to attend religious educa-
tion classes.
Alevi groups herald the decision as 
monumental in their 20-year struggle for 
religious freedom. Ms. Zengin’s lawyer, 
Kazim Genc, also applauds the decision, 
saying that the decision solves the recent 
debate about the justice of compulsory 
religious education, and the continuance of 
such education in a new liberal constitu-
tion. Genc believes the Court’s ruling affir-
matively requires that the new constitution 
not include compulsory religious lessons. 
The government’s current support of com-
pulsory religious education stands in stark 
contrast to Turkey’s increasing secularism, 
as highlighted by Turkey’s controversial 
ban on the wearing of the hijab in schools 
and the workplace. Therefore, the elimina-
tion of compulsory religious lessons seems 
logical to bring education into conformity 
with the other more secular aspects of 
Turkish society.
PiloT JudgmeNT PRoceduRe 
successful iN Polish Bug  
RiveR cases
The Grand Chamber of the Court deliv-
ered a judgment in Broniowski v. Poland 
on June 22, 2004. This decision marked 
the first time the Court used the pilot judg-
ment procedure — a method for the Court 
to deal once with a systemic problem 
raised in numerous cases, thus allowing 
the Court to manage its increasing case-
load more effectively. Human rights activ-
ists and non-governmental organizations 
also applaud the pilot judgment procedure 
as a method for introducing class action 
cases to the Court. On December 4, 2007, 
the Court decided that Poland met the 
requirements set forth in the pilot judg-
ment. It thus dismissed remaining cases 
with claims based upon the same violation 
raised in Broniowski v. Poland.
Browniowski v. Poland was one of 
several of the so-called Bug River Cases, 
involving Poland’s failure to satisfy the 
claims of persons who had been living in 
the Eastern provinces of pre-World War II 
Poland and had to repatriate to Poland after 
the redrawing of Poland’s eastern border 
along the Bug River at the end of the war. 
A 1946 Polish law entitled repatriated per-
sons to compensation in kind for their lost 
property. They had the right to buy land 
from the state and have the value of the 
abandoned property offset either against 
the fee for the “perpetual use” of this land, 
or against the price of the compensatory 
property or land. The Local Government 
Act of May 10, 1990 reduced the pool of 
government property available to the Bug 
River claimants, however, which meant the 
Polish treasury could not fulfill its obliga-
tion to meet compensation claims. The 
Law of 12 December 2003, which entered 
into force on January 30, 2004, discharged 
Poland’s obligations towards all Bug River 
claimants who had obtained any compen-
satory property under the previous legisla-
tion at any point, even if this compensatory 
property did not fully compensate them for 
their lost property.
The Grand Chamber of the Court ruled 
against Poland on June 22, 2004, holding 
that Poland had to take steps to ensure 
proper compensation of Bug River claim-
ants. The Court also found that Poland 
violated Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the 
Convention, which guarantees the protec-
tion of property. In response to the Court’s 
judgment, Poland passed a new law in 
2005 that set the ceiling for compensation 
for Bug River property at 20 percent of 
the property’s original value. This law was 
based on the friendly settlement reached 
between Broniowski — one of the repatri-
ated persons — and Poland, which pro-
vided Broniowski with a lump sum of 20 
percent of his claim. In furtherance of the 
law, the Ministry for the State Treasury 
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transmitted documents to the National 
Economy Bank enabling payment of com-
pensation to 1,730 people. On December 
4, 2007, the Court decided that Poland’s 
new law and compensation scheme is 
effective in practice, and that the law pro-
vides adequate domestic compensation. 
Accordingly, under the pilot judgment 
procedure, the Court struck out 40 pending 
Polish cases, and is likely to strike out the 
remaining 230 cases in early 2008.
fReNch deNial of BaBy’s  
ReTuRN To BiRTh moTheR  
NoT a violaTioN
Irish national Karen Kearns gave birth 
in France to a daughter from an extramari-
tal relationship, registered her daughter’s 
birth anonymously, and gave her daughter 
up for adoption. French law allows for 
anonymous registration of a birth, and 
stipulates that a birth mother has two 
months to change her mind and request 
the return of her child. Kearns, however, 
did not request the return of her daughter 
until five months after her daughter’s birth. 
French social services refused Kearns’s 
request for return of her child, and, after 
the French Court of Cassation also ruled 
against Kearns, she brought the case to the 
Court.
Kearns’s primary complaints were 
based on the brevity of the two-month 
period in which she could request the 
return of her child and the failure of French 
social services to provide her with suffi-
cient linguistic assistance to understand all 
the implications of anonymously register-
ing the birth of her child. She argued that 
these circumstances violated Article 8 of 
the Convention, the right to respect for pri-
vate and family life. The Court found for 
France in both issues. Council of Europe 
Member States have not reached a consen-
sus regarding adoption and the time limit 
for withdrawing consent. Therefore, the 
Court said greater latitude had to be given 
to a state in striking a balance between 
competing public and private interests. 
Most important among those interests — 
including those of the biological mother, 
the adoptive family, and the public — were 
the child’s best interests. France argued 
that child welfare professionals determined 
that it was in the child’s interests to enjoy 
stable emotional relations with a new fam-
ily as soon as possible. In response, the 
Court decided that the two-month limit 
was reasonable.
On the issue of the lack of informa-
tion and linguistic assistance provided to 
Kearns, the Court declared that Kearns 
had received adequate information. Kearns 
had chosen to come to France to take 
advantage of the possibility of anonymous 
registration of the birth, which was not 
available in Ireland. Kearns had also vis-
ited the maternity ward before the birth 
with her lawyer, and had had two lengthy 
interviews with social services in the pres-
ence of interpreters. The Court determined 
Kearns understood the implications of her 
decision because French social services 
had taken all the steps necessary to ensure 
that Kearns understood the implications of 
her actions.
Based on this reasoning, the Court 
decided unanimously on January 10, 2008 
that there was no violation of Article 8 of 
the Convention. The Court decided that a 
child’s best interests, particularly the inter-
ests in a stable family life, are more impor-
tant than a biological mother’s right to 
her child. The Court’s decision, however, 
does seem to imply that the case could 
have been decided differently, or decided 
by employing different reasoning, if there 
had been consensus among the Council of 
Europe Member States concerning adop-
tion and appropriate time limits for with-
drawing consent.
iNTeR-ameRicaN sysTem
The Inter-American Human Rights 
System was created with the Adoption of 
the American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man in 1948. In 1959, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights 
was established as an independent organ 
of the Organization of American States. 
In the 1969, the American Convention 
on Human Rights (the Convention) was 
adopted. This Convention further defined 
the role of the Commission and created the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(the Court). The Commission may recom-
mend cases to the Court, which determines 
liability under relevant regional treaties and 
agreements, including the Convention.
maNdaToRy deaTh PeNalTy 
violaTioN of RighTs To life  
aNd faiR TRial
In Boyce et al. v. Barbados the Court 
addressed whether a mandatory death 
penalty for persons convicted of mur-
der contravenes rights protected in the 
Convention. On November 20, 2007, the 
Court held that Barbados violated Article 4 
of the Convention, which protects the right 
to life, when it sentenced Lennox Ricardo 
Boyce, Jeffrey Joseph, Frederick Benjamin 
Atkins, and Michael McDonald Huggins 
(the accused) to death in accordance with 
Section 2 of Barbados’s Offences Against 
the Person Act of 1868. The Court also 
found that the Barbadian Constitution, 
which does not allow for judicial reform 
of laws that existed before independence, 
violates Article 2, requiring States Parties 
to adopt measures to give effect to the 
rights protected by the Convention, in rela-
tion to Articles 4 and 8.1, which relate to 
fair trial rights.
The state argued that the mandatory 
death penalty does not violate Article 4 of 
the Convention for several reasons. First, 
the punishment is mandated by Barbadian 
law; second, each accused is judged indi-
vidually, in accordance with due process 
requirements; and third, individual circum-
stances are taken into consideration by the 
Barbados Privy Council, a branch of the 
executive, when deciding whether or not to 
commute a death sentence.
The Court held that the mandatory 
death penalty violates the protection 
against arbitrary execution enshrined in 
Article 4.1 by not allowing consideration 
of the individual circumstances of each 
case, such as the degree of culpability 
of the accused. Furthermore, the Court 
found that due process requirements are 
not upheld in determining the appropriate 
punishment if the accused is convicted, but 
only in determining the guilt or innocence 
of the accused.
The Court held that the judiciary should 
have the power to decide whether to apply 
the death penalty. The Court distinguished 
between the right to have a “competent 
court” determine whether the death penalty 
is the appropriate sentence under Article 
4.2 and the right to “apply for amnesty, 
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pardon, or commutation of sentence” under 
Article 4.6.
The state argued that it did not violate 
the Convention since the death penalty had 
not been carried out, would not be carried 
out against three of the accused, and was 
unlikely to be carried out against a fourth 
accused. The Court found, however, that 
Articles 4.1 and 4.2 were violated from 
the moment the accused were sentenced 
to death.
The “savings clause” of Section 26 of 
the Barbadian Constitution takes away 
courts’ power to review the constitution-
ality of laws existing before the country 
became independent. The state argued that 
Section 26 is not inherently a violation of 
Article 2 of the Convention — the duty to 
bring domestic legislation into compliance 
with the Convention — as it does not pre-
vent Parliament from amending, repealing, 
or substituting existing laws.
The Court held that by preventing 
judicial scrutiny over Section 2 of the 
Offences Against the Person Act, the “sav-
ings clause” violates the right not to be 
arbitrarily deprived of life, as protected 
in Article 4. The Judicial Committee of 
the Barbadian Privy Council, in its delib-
eration, stated that, “[W]ere it not for the 
savings clause, [we] would have declared 
the mandatory death penalty contrary to 
the constitutional right not to be subjected 
to cruel, inhuman and degrading punish-
ment.” The Court concluded that Section 
26 violates Article 2 of the Convention 
as it does not allow for the modification 
of domestic laws to protect the rights 
enshrined in the Convention.
deTeNTioN PRoceduRes aNd 
coNTRol of PRoPeRTy PeNdiNg 
TRial deemed violaTioNs  
of coNveNTioN
On November 21, 2007 the Court held 
that the Republic of Ecuador violated the 
Convention’s Articles 7 and 21, protecting 
personal liberty and property, respectively, 
in relation to the detention of Chaparro 
Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez. The Court also 
found that the controversy surrounding 
Articles 2 (requiring States Parties to give 
effect to the Convention’s protections); 
5 (providing for a right to humane treat-
ment); 8 (protecting fair trial rights); and 
25 (providing a right to judicial protection) 
ceased when the state recognized their 
violation.
On November 14, 1997 the Ecuadorian 
anti-narcotic police impounded a ship-
ment of fish in Guayaquil destined for 
Miami. The police detected cocaine and 
heroin chlorohydrate in the ship’s ice-
boxes. Expert testimony suggested that the 
drugs were put into the iceboxes during 
the manufacturing process. Chaparro was 
the owner of Aislantes Plumavit Compañía 
Ltd., a company that manufactured ice-
boxes similar to those impounded. Police 
arrested Chapparo along with Lapo, the 
factory manager. 
The Court found several Article 7 vio-
lations relating to the suspects’ initial 
detention. First, the Court held that Lapo’s 
detention violated Article 7.2 because the 
judge did not issue a warrant for his arrest 
until after he was detained. Second, the 
Court found a violation of Articles 7.2 
and 7.4 when the state failed to prove that 
Chaparro was notified of the reasons for 
his detention. Third, the Court held that the 
state violated Articles 7.2 and 7.5 by not 
bringing Chaparro before a judge within 
48 hours, where he could argue against the 
necessity of his detention, as mandated by 
Ecuador’s penal code.
The Court stated that a suspect can 
only be detained pending a trial verdict 
in three situations. First, a suspect can be 
detained once an initial investigation has 
led to a reasonable suspicion that the sus-
pect indeed committed the crime. Second, 
detention is permitted to ensure that the 
suspect does not impede the investigation. 
Finally, detention is allowed to prevent 
the suspect from fleeing. The Court found 
that Chaparro and Lapo’s detention was 
arbitrary and, therefore, in violation of 
Article 7.3 because the police had no cause 
to reasonably suspect they had committed 
the crime, and the judge authorized their 
detention before the results of the inves-
tigation became available. Additionally, 
neither the second nor third justifications 
of detention applied.
In relation to Article 21, the Court held 
that Ecuadorian law did not violate the 
Convention per se, because the law only 
permitted a deprivation of property in 
limited circumstances. Under Ecuadorian 
law, deprivation of property is only per-
mitted to avoid goods being used in illicit 
acts; to procure the success of the criminal 
investigation; to guarantee funds to cover 
any eventual verdict; or to avoid loss or 
deterioration of evidence.
The Court found that the method of car-
rying out the law became arbitrary when the 
judge refused to evaluate evidence about 
whether Aislantes Plumavit Compañía Ltd. 
was involved and whether its goods should 
remain impounded. Furthermore, the Court 
held that the state violated Article 21 
because there was no clear link between the 
goods impounded and the crime. The Court 
also held that the state violated Article 21 
because it was disproportionate to require 
the suspects, once acquitted, to pay for the 
costs of impounding their goods.
BalaNce sTRuck BeTWeeN 
iNdigeNous RighT To laNd TiTle 
aNd sTaTe develoPmeNT Needs
The Court decided the case of the 
Saramaka People v. Suriname on November 
28, 2007. It held that the Republic of 
Suriname violated Articles 2 (requiring 
States Parties to ensure effective protec-
tion of the Convention’s provisions); 3 
(providing a right to juridical personality); 
21 (protecting property rights); and 25 
(providing a right to judicial protection) 
of the Convention by not recognizing and 
protecting the communal property rights 
of the Saramaka people. The Court found 
that the Saramaka people constitute a tribal 
community because they have social, cul-
tural, and economic traditions different 
from the national community, because 
they identify themselves with their ances-
tral territories, and because they regulate 
themselves according to their own norms, 
customs, and traditions.
Suriname has an obligation to enact mea-
sures aimed at guaranteeing the Saramaka 
people’s physical and cultural survival 
under the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights. The Court found that Suriname has 
a duty to protect the Saramaka people’s 
property title because land is not only a 
source of subsistence for them but also of 
spiritual and cultural identity. By failing 
to recognize the Saramaka as a juridical 
personality, the state prevents them from 
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being eligible to receive communal title to 
their land. The Court held that in addition 
to the state-granted privilege of using their 
land, the Saramaka people have a right to 
the land’s title. 
Suriname currently allows timber and 
gold-mining activity on the Saramaka peo-
ple’s land. While acknowledging that the 
Saramaka have a right to prevent the state 
or third parties from appropriating their 
resources, the Court found that the state 
may restrict the enjoyment of this right if 
the restrictions are previously established 
by law, necessary, proportional, and aimed 
at “achieving a legitimate objective in a 
democratic society.” The Court instructed 
the state that it must consult in good faith 
with the Saramaka people when granting 
permits for exploration and development. 
In addition, the state must share the ben-
efits of its activities with the Saramaka 
people. Furthermore, the state must ensure 
that independent and competent environ-
mental and social impact assessments 
are conducted. In granting timber and 
gold-mining concessions, the state did not 
undertake any of these three actions and, 
thus, violated Article 21. HRB
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